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Purpose: To provide control and ownership percentages for the three largest shareholders, 
details on their identity types and affinities, and their participation in formal agreements in 
Brazilian listed companies. 
 
Design/Methodology/Approach: Direct percentage holdings of voting and non-voting 
shares computed for 399 listed companies in 2007 according to four listing segments. The 
three largest direct and ultimate shareholders were classified into nine identity types and as 
signatories of shareholder agreements. 
 
Findings: The concentration of control rights remains very high but is significantly lower in 
the most demanding listing segment. There is a great similarity in identity types among the 
three largest shareholders of a company. Shareholder agreements are common either with 
or without a controlling shareholder and more frequent with greater control dispersion. 
The largest shareholder is a signatory in most agreements. 
 
Research Limitations/Implications: The pervasive affinity among the largest shareholders, 
the ubiquity of shareholder agreements, and the resilient control concentration levels cast 
doubts about the possible positive effects that more control dispersion and fewer non-
voting shares might had. Any gains from ownership arrangement changes still need to be 
addressed. 
 
Practical Implications: Investors must be aware that benefits from greater control dispersion 
may be offset by formal and informal agreements among the largest shareholders. 
 
Originality/Value: The sample includes virtually all listed companies, agreements were 
investigated in all of them, and identity associations were mapped directly and indirectly 
for the three largest shareholders. 
 
Keywords: Control Concentration, Ownership Concentration, Shareholders Agreements, 
Shareholder Affiliation. 
 




1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
We investigate the control and ownership percentages, the identity, and the formal 
coalitions among the three largest shareholders of Brazilian listed companies. The control 
and ownership percentages portray the degree of concentration of the equity capital 
among the three major shareholders. The similarities in identity types among the three 
largest shareholders indicate their potential affinity of interests for informal or formal 
coalitions. Shareholder agreements are hard evidences of such coalitions. Shareholder 
coalitions may be formed to exercise control effectively and may result in better monitoring 
of the controlling shareholder. The coalition may inhibit the extraction of private benefits by 
the largest shareholders, on behalf of the minority shareholders, or may simply lead to 
their sharing among the coalition members, in detriment of the minority.  
Control is very concentrated in Brazil. We report an average direct control 
concentration of 59 percent for the largest shareholder and of 77 percent for the three 
largest shareholders jointly in 2007. Even though these percentages are high, they have 
declined in the last few years. Leal and Carvalhal da Silva (2007) related average direct 
control concentration of 71 and 89 percent for the largest and the three largest 
shareholders jointly in 2002, respectively. 
Brazilian companies use non-voting shares intensively but their aggregate 
proportions in the equity capital have decreased since 2004 because many companies 
unified their shares and migrated to the Novo Mercado listing segment. In addition, most 
companies that went public after 2004 listed in this new segment of the exchange as well. 
The Novo Mercado listing segment requires that companies issue only voting shares. The 
Brazilian corporate law establishes that there is one vote per voting share and does not 
admit multiple vote common shares. Novo Mercado imposes a number of additional 
transparency and corporate governance practices, investor protection charter provisions, 
arbitration for dispute resolution between the company and shareholders, and a minimum 
liquidity level.  
We reveal that control concentration levels are remarkably lower in Novo Mercado 
compared to the other three less demanding listing levels. We provide more details about 
all listing levels later. Bortolon (2010) portrays that the number of companies with their 
equity capital comprised exclusively of voting shares tripled from 2000 (56) to 2008 (163). 
Yet, Leal (2011) reports that slightly more than 50 percent of them still include non-voting 
shares in their equity capital. Some of them exhibit very large proportions of non-voting 
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shares, and among those are the two larger capitalization companies in Brazil, Petrobras, 
the state-owned oil giant, which accomplished the largest worldwide public offer of stocks 
of all times in 2010, and Vale, the second largest mining company in the world and the 
largest non state-owned company in Latin America, that displayed 42 and 39 percent of 
non-voting shares in their equity capital on 31 December 2009, respectively.  
Brazilian non-voting shares are called "preferred shares" and must offer additional 
rights stipulated in the law to its owners when they do not grant the right to vote, a 
condition that has to be established in the charter. Companies usually opt to pay a ten 
percent higher dividends to non-voting shareholders relative to those of voting 
shareholders but, sometimes, they concede a mandatory bid right to non-voting 
shareholders between 80 and 100 percent of the acquisition price paid to controlling 
shareholders in control transfer dealings. In addition to non-voting shares, Bortolon (2010) 
demonstrates that 77 percent of her sample of 255 listed companies in 2006 makes use 
of indirect control structures. Direct control by the largest shareholder is maintained 
throughout the indirect structure in 24 percent of such companies, is shared in 22 percent 
of them, and is diluted in four percent of them. Control is gained throughout the indirect 
structure by multiple large shareholders in 23 percent of the companies and by a single 
shareholder in four percent of them.  
The number of companies with more disperse control in Brazil has grown. The 
number of companies with more than 50 percent of their shares free floating in the market 
was around 30 percent of the total of companies in the Novo Mercado and about ten 
percent of the total of listed companies, according to Capital Aberto magazine (2008).  
Yet, concentrated control is still the norm in Brazil, as in many emerging markets, and it 
may be a mixed blessing. Controlling shareholders monitor managers more effectively but 
may try to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. There is more 
variety in Brazilian control patterns now, with some dispersed control companies, many 
companies with multiple large shareholders, and still a majority of companies with a clear 
dominant shareholder but that frequently use shareholder agreements, as we will show.   
Our results picture a declining concentrated ownership, the prevalence of indirect 
control structures and the widespread, but declining, use of nonvoting shares. On the 
other hand, the use of agreements is on the rise which may offset any benefits from 
dispersion. There is much similarity between the identity types of the largest shareholders, 
particularly individuals. The affinity among may favor their informal congruence on and 
above any formal agreements.  
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Relative to previous work about Brazilian ownership and control, our contribution is 
to examine a sample that includes virtually all listed companies, while Leal and Carvalhal 
da Silva (2007), for instance, reported only from the most liquid firms because they 
intended to analyze market values as well. We provide details of control and ownership 
percentages for the three largest shareholders according to four listing levels and the 
existence or not of a controlling shareholder. Gorga (2009) studied agreements among 
companies without a controlling shareholder while we investigated agreements in all listed 
companies and demonstrated that they are also very common in companies with a 
controlling shareholder. We provide a detailed analysis of the similarities in the identity 
types of the three largest shareholders, which has not been offered before, to the best of 
our knowledge. The evidence for Brazil may be representative for other Latin American 
countries as well as for many emerging markets elsewhere. This paper proceeds with a 
brief review of the literature, followed by a section about the sample and then our analysis 
of the results. The final portion of the paper concludes. 
 
2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find that the five largest shareholders in a sample of 511 
US corporations commonly have between ten and 25 percent of ownership concentration. 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) do not observe a relationship between ownership and 
performance and argue that the profit maximizing interests of shareholders drive their 
decisions to either concentrate or disperse ownership and, thus, no relationship between 
firm performance and ownership changes should exist. They also claim that the bulk of 
previous research supports that managerial ownership and performance are unrelated. 
Ownership structures assume the configuration that is the most suitable to the market in 
which firms operate and market values reflect this, leading to no discernable pattern 
between performance and ownership, which is endogenous. They studied a randomly 
selected subsample of 223 US firms from the Demsetz and Lehn (1985) sample. 
In line with the concept of market dependent configuration, Gomes and Novaes 
(2005) conceive a model in which shared control is efficient when the financing 
requirements of the firm are large and it is difficult for outsiders to evaluate investment 
opportunities, particularly in jurisdictions offering poor investor protection, which may be 
the case of many emerging markets. The presence of large non-managerial shareholders 
may inhibit the consumption of private benefits by the major managing shareholder. These 
additional large shareholders could have the resources and the incentives to monitor the 
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largest shareholder. It is also possible that they persuade the major shareholder to share 
the benefits of control with them. Zwiebel (1995) presents a model in which private 
benefits of control are divisible and shared among block shareholders who form control 
coalitions. Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) develop a model for a closely held 
corporation in which large shareholders would have the motivation to form a coalition 
large enough to gain control, but not too large not to leave out other shareholders who 
may be expropriated.  
Pergola and Verreault (2009) review the empirical literature about the monitoring 
role of large shareholders and conclude that their presence may result in benefits shared 
among all shareholders if they are corporate block holders who are not affiliated with 
management and not part of a control coalition. The identity, affinity, and formal 
association among large shareholders may result in either positive or negative effects to 
minority shareholders. Maury and Pajuste (2005) analyze the effect multiple large 
shareholders have on the performance of 136 non-financial Finnish firms during between 
1993 and 2000. The performance of companies that have families as their controlling 
and second largest shareholder is worst than when the second largest shareholder is not a 
family. They conclude that the affinity that may exist when families are the two largest 
shareholders reduces the marginal cost of extracting control benefits.  
Laeven and Levine (2008) find that single controlling shareholder firms make up 50 
percent of their European sample, while multiple controlling shareholder firms and 
dispersed control firms make up 34 and 16 percent of the sample, respectively. Departures 
from the "one share, one vote" principle may be reflected in the disparity between the 
control and cash flow rights owned by the largest shareholders. Control rights percentages 
that are not commensurate to cash flow rights percentages may convey a non trivial 
likelihood of serious conflicts of interest between major and minority shareholders. The 
average Tobin's Q is larger for dispersed ownership firms (2.03) and for companies with 
multiple large shareholders with commensurate cash flow rights (1.94) and lower for single 
majority shareholder firms (1.61) in Laeven and Levine (2008). The authors conclude that 
disparities between the holdings of the two largest shareholders harm firm value. Lins 
(2003) finds that the proportion of control belonging to management is negatively 
associated with firm value in 18 emerging markets. This relationship is mitigated when 
other large shareholders exist.   
Non-voting shares coupled with indirect control structures may leverage control. 
Bortolon (2010) estimated the average indirect control concentration of the largest and of 
the three largest shareholders at 46 and 67 percent, respectively, in 2006. She estimated 
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the ratio of the average indirect percentage of voting rights to the average indirect 
percentage of ownership rights of the largest and of the three largest shareholders to be 
1.67 and 1.49, respectively, in 2006. Brazilian controlling shareholders seem to employ 
non-voting shares to leverage their share of control. Bortolon (2010) also believes that the 
presence of indirect control structures, in addition to non-voting shares, leverage control 
even more.  
Leal and Carvalhal da Silva (2008) recount that Brazilian companies that employed 
indirect control structures had a lower market value than those that did not in 2002 but 
they do not perform a causality analysis. They also give an account that firms with a direct 
controlling shareholder that does not keep control indirectly have a larger market value 
than those in which the direct controlling shareholder remains as the ultimate controlling 
shareholder indirectly. However, the authors do not find that companies with a direct 
controlling shareholder have a lower market value than those that do not. The positive 
valuation effects of ownership seem to be associated with the presence of indirect control 
structures and the dilution of control rights within it. There are more incidences of 
shareholders agreements when there is a dispersion of control rights in the indirect control 
structure. The authors report that 22 percent of the firms in their sample of 214 listed 
companies have shareholders agreements. Gorga (2009) reckoned that 50 percent of her 
sample of 84 Brazilian firms without a direct controlling shareholder had shareholder 
agreements.  
Leal and Oliveira (2002) noticed the rise in the use of shareholder agreements in 
Brazil. Gorga (2009) presents a detailed analysis of the clauses in these agreements and 
discusses their role in the increasing dispersion of ownership in Brazil. She reports that the 
law lets shareholders agreements regulate the purchase and sales of shares, the 
preference to acquire shares, and the exercise of voting rights and control. These 
agreements became more powerful when a corporate law reform in 2001 bound the 
voting of directors appointed by the their signatories to their will. Gorga (2009) asserts that 
Brazilian shareholders have strong incentives to disclose these agreements to the company 
because, if they do not, they cannot enforce it against no-signing parties, such as the 
directors they appoint. The process of disclosing to the company means that the 
agreement is added to the public registration records of the company.   
It is important to close with a mention of studies that investigated causality between 
value, performance, corporate governance practices, and control and ownership 
concentrations. Silveira et al. (2010) conclude that the relationship between corporate 
governance practices, represented by a practices score, control and ownership 
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percentages of the largest shareholders, market value, and accounting performance are 
endogenous. Leal and Carvalhal da Silva (2007) found no evidence of a relationship 
between the control and ownership levels and market value with the presence of a 
corporate governance practices score in a 3SLS model. The Brazilian evidence favors the 
views presented by some of the authors reviewed of no causal relationship between control 
and ownership percentages and corporate value and performance and, as a result, we did 
not pursue this line of investigation.  
The literature points out to the importance of the role of large shareholders, their 
identity, and their associations and formal coalitions. This study will focus on the three 
largest direct shareholders of Brazilian listed companies. 
 
3 – SAMPLE 
 
The sample consisted of the 409 Brazilian listed companies at the end of 2007. All 
information was obtained from their filings with CVM, the Brazilian Securities Commission 
(Comissão de Valores Mobiliários), at its Internet site. Ten companies did not report 
shareholdings for the year. The final sample included 399 companies.  
We analyze the direct holdings of the three largest shareholders. The company must 
reveal who are the holders of at least five percent of its voting shares. A list with 856 
shareholders (on average 2.14 shareholders per company) includes the three largest 
shareholders of the 399 companies which own at least five percent of the voting shares. A 
controlling shareholder is one that owns 50 percent or more of the voting shares.  
Shareholders were classified into one of these nine types: individual or families; 
private companies; public companies; banks (including financial institutions and insurance 
companies); pension funds; government; foreigners (either individuals or corporations); 
foundations; and others. The information about the identity of the indirect holders was 
obtained both from CVM and from the Infoinvest information service. We did not compute 
indirect holding percentages because they do not change significantly from one year to the 
next, in addition to being a slow and time consuming process. Indirect holdings for 2006 
are reported in Bortolon (2010) and Leal (2011) for 2002 and for previous years in Leal 
and Carvalhal da Silva (2007) and Aldrighi and Mazzer Neto (2007).   
Shareholders agreements in Brazil are common in companies with a controlling 
shareholder. We examined such agreements in all companies (with and without a 
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controlling shareholder) while Gorga (2009) examined only those in companies without a 
controlling shareholder. 
4 – RESULTS 
 
The four listing segments for stocks at BM&FBovespa (the Brazilian securities, 
merchandise, and derivatives exchange) are called Traditional, Level 1, Level 2, and Novo 
Mercado. The Traditional segment was the only one up to the year 2000 and it does not 
make any additional requirements to what is legally mandated. The other three levels 
comprise what the exchange calls Differentiated Corporate Governance Levels, created in 
2000. Level 1 is the least demanding. Its additional requirements are concerned with more 
liquidity and transparency, and include additional financial statements, such as a cash flow 
and consolidated statements, disclosure of details of related party transactions and of 
company stock and derivatives trading by the controlling shareholders, at least one annual 
meeting with securities analysts, keeping at least 25 percent of its shares free floating, and 
to favor public stock issuance methods that lead to greater dispersion. Level 2 
encompasses all the requirements in Level 1 and adds a number of mandatory corporate 
governance practices, such board size of at least five members with a minimum of 20 
percent of them independent, submission to arbitration for dispute resolution with 
shareholders, mandatory bid rights respectively to minority voting and non-voting 
shareholders of 100 and of 80 percent of the price offered to controlling shareholders in 
control transfer transactions, and voting rights to non-voting shareholders in corporate 
restructuring decisions, among other requirements. It also requires the adoption of 
international accounting standards, which have been required from all public companies 
in Brazil from 2010.  The Novo Mercado encompasses all the requirements of Levels 1 
and 2 plus a ban on the issuance of non-voting stocks. Our sampled companies include 
246 listed in the Traditional segment (62%), 93 in the Novo Mercado (23%), 41 in Level 1 
(10%), and 19 in Level 2 (5%).  
 
4.1 Holding patterns of the three largest shareholders 
Table 1 shows the number of companies with and without a controlling shareholder 
in the different listing segments. In the Novo Mercado, only 32 percent of the companies 
have a single controlling shareholder while about 75 percent of the companies in the 
other listing segments have a controlling shareholder. The shareholding of Brazilian 
companies at the end of 2007 still was very concentrated. Sixty-five percent of all 
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companies (260) have a single shareholder with more than 50 percent of the voting 
capital. The controlling shareholder of these companies averages 77.74% of the voting 
capital with a median of 79.57%. Medians, standard deviations, minimum and maximum 
values of the shareholding percentages are not reported in Table 1 to save space but are 
available upon request. The largest shareholder of companies without a controlling 
shareholder (139) averaged 30.48% of the voting shares, with a median of 29.27%. 
These figures are similar to those reported for 2002 by Leal and Carvalhal da Silva 
(2007), whose sample included 214 among the most liquid firms, and by Aldrighi and 
Mazzer Neto (2007), whose much broader sample of 666 firms included non-listed public 
companies as well.  
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 TABLE 1  Descriptive statistics according to listing segment 








All listing segments:     
# firms 260 139 399 
# firms with shareholder agreement 46 55 101 
Shareholding averages (%):    
Voting - largest 77.74 30.48 61.27 
Voting - three largest together 89.22 58.16 78.32 
Non-voting - largest 28.25 8.47 23.34 
Non-voting - three largest together 35.48 22.33 32.17 
All shares - largest 63.37 25.92 50.33 
All shares - three largest together 73.26 49.87 65.05 
Novo Mercado (admits voting shares only):  
# firms 30 63 93 
# firms with shareholder agreement 7 31 38 
Shareholding averages (%):    
Voting - largest 59.48 27.18 37.60 
Voting - 2nd largest 8.88 13.92 12.66 
Voting - 3rd largest 6.84 9.23 8.88 
Level 1:     
# firms 31 10 41 
# firms with shareholder agreement 7 7 14 
Shareholding averages (%):    
Voting - largest 73.18 32.39 63.23 
Voting - 2nd largest 19.32 19.76 19.46 
Voting - 3rd largest 8.64 13.46 10.67 
Non-voting - largest 11.77 0.93 9.12 
Non-voting - 2nd largest 9.81 5.09 8.34 
Non-voting - 3rd largest 5.88 0.66 3.68 
All shares - largest 40.06 16.50 34.32 
All shares - 2nd largest 14.83 12.58 14.12 
All shares - 3rd largest 6.72 7.44 7.03 
Level 2:     
# firms 14 5 19 
# firms with shareholder agreement 7 4 11 
Shareholding averages (%):    
Voting - largest 78.21 37.78 67.57 
Voting - 2nd largest 17.45 17.41 17.44 
Voting - 3rd largest 9.33 9.47 9.42 
Non-voting - largest 24.11 4.94 19.07 
Non-voting - 2nd largest 7.97 20.94 12.60 
Non-voting - 3rd largest 0.37 0.02 0.16 
All shares - largest 51.96 22.22 44.13 
All shares - 2nd largest 11.47 14.39 12.51 
All shares - 3rd largest 4.23 4.87 4.63 
Traditional:     
# firms 185 61 246 
# firms with shareholder agreement 25 13 38 
Shareholding averages (%):    
Voting - largest 81.42 32.98 69.41 
Voting - 2nd largest 18.54 22.89 20.20 
Voting - 3rd largest 8.65 13.93 11.66 
Non-voting - largest 31.33 10.00 26.04 
Non-voting - 2nd largest 11.03 8.28 9.98 
Non-voting - 3rd largest 8.87 6.51 7.53 
All shares - largest 68.77 26.47 58.28 
All shares - 2nd largest 15.97 18.56 16.96 




Shareholding concentration patterns, however, are not the same for all listing 
segments.  Table 1 provides a detailed description of the shareholding percentages in the 
four listing segments, showing the voting and cash-flow rights (voting plus non-voting 
shares) proportions of each one of the three largest shareholders. The Novo Mercado has 
the second largest number of issues at the exchange (93) and is characterized by a 
relatively low concentration of control. The largest shareholder in the companies with a 
controlling shareholder holds on average 59.48% of the voting rights, which are identical 
to his cash flow rights due to the “one share, one vote” in this listing segment. The largest 
shareholder in companies with no controlling shareholder holds on average only 27.18% 
of the voting rights. This segment is also characterized by a low number of companies in 
which there is a controlling shareholder (only 30 out of 93). These numbers are 
considerably lower than in the other listing segments.  
The holdings of the three largest shareholders in Level 1 are much different than 
those in Novo Mercado. Forty one companies are listed in this segment and the largest 
shareholder in companies with a controlling shareholder (31 companies) holds on average 
73.18% of the voting capital. The second and third shareholders hold, on average, 
19.32% and 8.64%, respectively. In companies with no controlling shareholders (10 
companies) the voting capital proportions of the first, second and third largest 
shareholders are 32.39%, 19.76% and 13.46%, respectively. The average voting capital 
percentage held by the second and third largest shareholders is not greatly affected by the 
presence of a controlling shareholder. The results for Level 2 are very similar.  
The percentage of non-voting shares held by the largest shareholders are much 
smaller, specially for the largest shareholder. The largest shareholder holds six times less 
non-voting shares than voting shares in companies they control. Nevertheless, they still 
hold the largest average percentage of non-voting shares. In companies with no 
controlling shareholder, there is no such pattern and the average holding of non-voting 
shares by the largest shareholder is miniscule. The pattern of lower percentages of non-
voting shares relative to the percentages of voting shares held by the second and third 
largest shareholder is similar, but the drop in average percentages may be less abrupt.  
One possible explanation could be that the largest shareholder is also interested in a 
larger share of cash-flow rights or, maybe even more plausible, because non-voting shares 
may be more liquid than the voting shares in the control block, the controlling shareholder 
wants the ability to trade in the company’s stock without changing his/her control 
proportions. This pattern is somewhat the same in Level 2.  
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The Traditional segment consists of companies that did not migrate to the more 
demanding listing levels and is the largest in terms of the number of companies (246) and 
the one that showed the highest concentration of control levels. Table 1 shows that the 
largest shareholder in companies with a controlling shareholder (185) holds on average 
81.42% of the voting capital. The second and third shareholders hold on average 18.54% 
and 8.65%, respectively. The three major shareholders in companies with no controlling 
shareholders (61) hold on average 32.98%, 22.89% and 13.93% of the voting capital, 
respectively. In companies with a controlling shareholder, the three largest shareholders 
hold on average 31.33%, 11.03% and 8.87% of the non-voting capital, respectively. They 
hold 10.00%, 8.28% and 6.51% of the non-voting shares, respectively, in companies with 
no controlling shareholder. The percentages of non-voting shares held by the largest 
shareholder seem to be higher in the Traditional level. It is well-known that most 
companies in this segment display very low liquidity. On the other hand, one could argue 
that the relatively high holdings of non-voting shares by the largest shareholder may 
partially align his or her interests with those in the minority.  
We perform pair wise comparisons of the average holdings of the three largest 
shareholders in each listing segment. We use both the parametrical t-test as well as the 
non-parametrical Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon rank test. The holding percentages of voting 
shares by the largest shareholder is significantly lower in the Novo Mercado than in the 
other segments for both tests at the one percent level. The results are qualitatively the same 
for the second and third largest shareholders, between Novo Mercado and the Level 1 and 
Traditional segments, with slightly lower significance, but there was no significant 
difference relative to Level 2. There were no differences in means between the other 
segments. The detailed mean difference tests are available upon request.  
 
4.2 Relationship between shareholders 
 Shareholders of the same type may create unwritten covenants among themselves 
more easily because of their affinity. The 856 direct shareholders were classified into the 9 
types presented in Table 2. Most are private companies (41.59%), which is consistent with 
the widespread use of indirect control structures in Brazil. Individuals are the second most 
common type of shareholder and comprise 17.64 percent of them. Foreigners, individuals 



























 Private Co. 209 52,38 88 32,00 59 32,42 356 41,59 
Individual 48 12,03 55 20,00 48 26,37 151 17,64 
Foreigner 43 10,78 46 16,73 31 17,03 120 14,02 
Public Co. 40 10,03 13 4,73 5 2,75 58 6,78 
Bank 25 6,27 43 15,64 22 12,09 90 10,51 
Government 24 6,02 3 1,09 0 0,00 27 3,15 
Pension Fd. 5 1,25 17 6,18 13 7,14 35 4,09 
Others 4 1,00 3 1,09 2 1,10 9 1,05 
Foundation 1 0,25 7 2,55 2 1,10 10 1,17 
Total 399 100 275 100 182 100 856 100 
 
 
Private companies, individuals, and foreigners together comprise 73.25% of the 
total number of shareholders. We identified the type of the second largest shareholder 
when the identity type of the largest shareholder is one of these three. The results are in 
Table 3. The number of firms in which private companies are the largest shareholder falls 
from 209 in Table 2 to 149 in Table 3 because there was no second largest shareholder 
with more than the five percent disclosure threshold in 60 companies. In 65 out of these 
149 companies (43.72%) the second largest direct shareholder was a private company as 
well. The largest group of second largest indirect shareholders is individuals (35.57%), 
private companies (18.12%), foreigners (18.79%), and banks (14.77%) when the largest 
direct shareholder was a private company. The private companies that remained at the 




TABLE 3  Second largest shareholder given the identity type of the largest shareholder  
  Direct Holding Indirect holding 
Second Largest 
Shareholder 
Type No. % No. % 
When the largest is a 
private company (149) 
 
Private Co. 65 43,62 27 18,12 
Foreigner 26 17,45 28 18,79 
Bank 22 14,77 22 14,77 
Individual 17 11,41 53 35,57 
Pension Fd. 7 4,70 7 4,70 
Foundation 4 2,68 4 2,68 
Public Co. 4 2,68 4 2,68 
Others 3 2,01 3 2,01 
Government  1 0,67 1 0,67 
      
When the largest is an 
individual (43) 
 
Individual 26 60,47 33 76,74 
Private Co. 9 20,93 2 4,65 
Foreigner 4 9,30 4 9,30 
Foundation 2 4,65 2 4,65 
Bank 1 2,33 1 2,33 
Pension Fd. 1 2,33 1 2,33 
      
When the largest is a 
foreigner (33) 
 
Foreigner 14 42,42 15 45,45 
Individual 6 18,18 9 27,27 
Private Co. 6 18,18 2 6,06 
Bank 3 9,09 3 9,09 
Public Co. 2 6,06 2 6,06 
Pension Fd. 1 3,03 1 3,03 
Foundation 1 3,03 1 3,03 
 
 
Nearly all companies with an individual as the largest direct shareholder had a 
second shareholder with more than the five percent disclosure threshold (43 out of 48 
companies). This group showed the largest similarity between the largest and the second 
largest shareholder type. Twenty-six out of 43 companies had a second largest direct 
shareholder who was also an individual. Thirty-three companies exhibited individuals as 
the second largest indirect shareholder (76.74%). When the largest direct shareholder was 
foreign (33 companies), 42.42 percent of the second largest direct and 45.45 of the 
second largest indirect shareholders were also foreigners.  
Table 4 portrays all types of shareholders and the joint similarities between the two 
and three largest. Out of the 399 companies in the sample, 275 had at least two and 182 
had at least three large shareholders with holdings greater than the five percent threshold. 
In 119 companies the two largest direct shareholders were of the same kind. The two 
largest indirect shareholders are of the same type in 139 companies (50.55%). In 49 
companies the three largest direct shareholders are of the same type. In 61 companies the 
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three largest indirect shareholders are of the same type. Private companies and individuals 
accounted for most similarities. The data in Tables 3 and 4 reveal a large coincidence of 
shareholder types between the three largest direct and indirect shareholders, which could 
lead to greater affinity between them, relative to other shareholders, and to the easier 
formation of informal coalitions with similar interests.  
 
 TABLE  4   Identity type similarities between the three largest shareholders  
 
 Number of companies with the 1st and 2nd 
largest shareholders of the same type1 
Number of companies with the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd 
largest shareholders of the same type2 
 Direct Holding Indirect Holding Direct Holding Indirect Holding 
Type No. % of 275 No. % of 275 No. % of 182 No. % of 182 
Private Co. 65 23,64 30 10,91 24 13,19 4 2,20 
Individual 26 9,45 76 27,64 15 8,24 45 24,73 
Foreigner 14 5,09 18 6,55 6 3,30 8 4,40 
Bank 5 1,82 5 2,18 2 1,10 2 1,10 
Public Co. 5 1,82 6 1,82 1 0,55 1 0,55 
Government 2 0,73 2 0,73 0 0,00 0 0,00 
Pension Fd. 2 0,73 2 0,73 1 0,55 1 0,55 
Total 119 43,27 139 50,55 49 26,92 61 33,52 
 
Notes: (1) out of the 275 companies with at least two large shareholders with 5% or more of shareholding;    
(2) out of the 182 companies with at least three large shareholders with 5% or more of shareholding.  
 
 
4.3 Shareholders agreements 
 Shareholders agreements formally define the relationship among its signatories. It 
can, for example, assign veto power to a shareholder or determine that some (or all) 
shareholders will vote alike on certain issues. Gorga (2009) asserts that shareholders 
agreements have become an important and common corporate governance device in 
Brazil.  
Table 1 shows the number of valid shareholders agreements according to the listing 
segments and the existence of a controlling shareholder. Twenty-five percent (101) of the 
399 sampled companies had agreements by the end of 2007. Fifty-five percent of the 
agreements involve shareholders of companies without a controlling shareholder. Forty-
five percent of the agreements appeared in companies with a controlling shareholder, 
suggesting that formal coalitions are important for the largest shareholders too. As stated 
by Gomes and Novaes (2005), shared control is efficient when the financing requirements 
of the firm are large, when outsiders cannot evaluate investment opportunities easily, and 
investor protection is inadequate. Considering that there were 189 companies with three 
 
18 
shareholders owning more than five percent of the voting shares, observing 101 
companies with agreements is significant.  
The relative occurrence of shareholders agreements is greater for companies with 
no controlling shareholders listed in the Novo Mercado. The count of agreements is the 
same in the Novo Mercado and Traditional lists (38). However, in the Novo Mercado most 
of the agreements are found in companies without a controlling shareholder while this is 
just the opposite in the Traditional segment. There are relatively fewer companies without a 
controlling shareholder in the Traditional listing segment and the incidence of agreements 
is about half of that in the Novo Mercado.  
Table 5 pictures the participation of the three largest shareholders in such 
agreements and shows that the largest shareholder took part in 87.13% of them, while 
almost 30% involved the three major shareholders together. In all but one of the 55 
agreements in companies with no controlling shareholder, at least one of the three largest 
shareholders took part of the agreement.  The second and third largest shareholders rarely 
take part of an agreement without the largest one. In fact, we did not find a single 
agreement with the presence of the next two largest shareholders without the largest one. 
Our results suggest that shareholders display strong affinities and establish formal 
coalitions in most of the companies where there are two or three large shareholders and 
this almost certainly attenuates any positive effects of the dispersion of control. The virtual 
non-existence of agreements without the largest shareholders suggests that they are not an 
obvious instrument to monitor the largest shareholder but a means to join him or her in the 
exercise of control.  
 
















1+2+3 22 40,00 8 17,39 30 29,70 
1 + (2 or 3) 16 29,09 13 28,26 29 28,71 
1 + others 13 23,64 16 34,78 29 28,71 
2+3 without 1 0 0,00 0 0,00 0 0,00 
2 or 3 without 1 3 5,45 2 4,35 5 4,95 
Without 1, 2 and 3 1 1,82 7 15,22 8 7,92 





5 – CONCLUSIONS 
 
We examined the direct and indirect control percentages of the three largest 
shareholders of Brazilian listed companies in 2007 and mapped their potential affinities by 
means of the similarities of their identity types and of the incidence of agreements between 
them. Affinities may help the formation of formal or information coalitions with converging 
interests. These coalitions may align the largest shareholders in detriment of the interests of 
the minority.  
Overall control concentrations remain very high but are significantly lower in the 
Novo Mercado listing segment, the most demanding in the Brazilian exchange. Two thirds 
of the companies still possess a controlling shareholder with more than 50 percent of the 
votes and the average percentage of the voting rights of the largest shareholder is 
61.27%. The Novo Mercado does not allow non-voting shares, which were predominant 
in the exchange until a few years ago. Controlling shareholders in the other listing 
segments, particularly in the least demanding of them, even now hold a large proportion 
of non-voting shares, maybe to be able to trade without affecting their grip on control.  
There is a considerable potential for non-contractual covenants among 
shareholders. Informal agreements are likely among shareholders of the same identity 
type. Private companies, individuals, and foreigners are the most common types of 
shareholders. The analysis showed a very high incidence of shareholder similarity between 
the largest and the second largest shareholders. In about half of the companies the two 
largest indirect shareholders are of the same kind and in about one third of them the three 
largest shareholders are of the same type.  
 In more than half of the companies with more than three large shareholders there is 
a shareholders agreement. The largest shareholder takes part of them in the vast majority 
of cases and in no case the second and third largest shareholders jointly took part of an 
agreement without the largest shareholder. This suggests that the second and third largest 
shareholder join the largest one in the carrying out of control but do not use agreements 
among themselves to monitor the largest shareholder as a dissention. The greatest relative 
frequency of agreements was in the Novo Mercado, where there is significantly more 
dispersion of control rights, but we revealed that 45 percent of the agreements were in 
companies with a controlling shareholder. The resilient concentration of control levels, the 
rife potential affinities among shareholders, and the widespread incidence of shareholder 
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agreements, particularly in the Novo Mercado, cast doubts about the any positive impacts 
that control dispersion might have had on minority shareholders. 
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